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While the United States requires fixation for an original work to be entitled to federal 
copyright protection, many other countries ignore such requirement. The difference could lead to 
partial copyright protection standards across jurisdictions over certain works that are not fixed. 
Examples of such works include extemporaneous speeches, lectures, improvisational 
performances, and contemporary arts that are transitory. Moreover, with today’s rapid 
development of arts and technologies, creative works can be presented via new media without 
being fixed in a traditional way. The examples include live streams of lectures and music 
performances, which have become part of the “new normal.” In order to tackle the issue of the 
necessity of fixation, this paper looks into a brief historical development of copyright law, 
followed by an overview of copyright legislations of civil law countries in which authors of 
unfixed works enjoy copyright protection. The research then examines American copyright law 
and its unsettled definition of fixation, which articulates how the fixation requirement could easily  
exclude a large quantity of creative work from copyright protection. Lastly, the paper studies the 
roles of registration and deposition as copyright formalities in the United States to see whether 
they serve the same functions as the fixation requirement does. As registration and deposition 
formalities can perform the fixation requirement’s tasks, in light of promoting useful arts and 
rewarding authors for their creativity regardless of the form of expression, the paper suggests 
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Improvisational theater (“improv”) is a theatrical performance spontaneously and 
collectively created by the actors on stage employing creativity.1 During a performance, dialogues 
may include stories and jokes created as a stage improvisation product. In the United States, 
improv has continuously gained popularity; there are at least one hundred and forty-six improv 
reported groups in America, making the country the second most popular improv destination in 
the world after Germany.2 Even with the Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, improv 
popularity remains, with venues being moved to online platforms, 3 allowing borderless audiences 
to enjoy live streaming of improv shows. Nonetheless, under the current copyright regime, none 
of the dialogues and even choreographies that may occur during an improv session are protectable 
in the United States. Regardless of how much creativity the artists have put into their pieces, if the 
improvisational expressions have not been scripted prior, they would not enjoy copyright 
protection. That is because unscripted works do not pass a requirement called “fixation,” a 
copyright prerequisite under the United States jurisdiction.  
Fixation, however, is not a copyright prerequisite in civil law countries. In China, for 
instance, a court has recognized an oral lecture as a copyright subject matter.4 Thus, the difference 
creates a partial copyright protection standard across jurisdictions over unfixed works. Using 
improv as an example, the dialogues improvised during a show may be copyrightable in the civil 
 
1 See R. Keith Sawyer, Improvisation and the Creative Process: Dewey, Collingwood, and the Aesthetics of 
Spontaneity, the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 58, No. 2, Improvisation in the Arts, 149 (2000). 
2 See List of Improv Groups Worldwide, IMPROVWIKI (Dec. 24, 2020), 
https://improwiki.com/en/list_of_improv_groups_worldwide. 
3 See, e.g., IMPRO THEATRE, https://improtheatre.com/livestreaming/ (last visited Dec. 24, 2020) (which live-streams 
more than 20 improv performances in December 2020). 
4 See Chapter 3.3. 
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law countries, but not in the United States. Appropriation of jokes in an improv act live streamed 
from Germany, for instance, would be permissible in the United States, whereas in Germany, such 
act constitutes copyright infringement. As a result, the German improv artists may find a hard time 
seeking remedies against the misappropriation under the U.S. copyright law.5 Such problem does 
not only concern works of improv, but also any oral speeches, college lectures, improvisational 
music, User Generated Content (UGC)6, and contemporary arts that have inherently changeable 
mediums. 
 
Justifications and Critiques of Fixation 
As fixation can simply exclude certain types of creative arts from copyright protection, 
why is fixation worth having? First, it is suggested that fixation is designed to play an evidentiary 
role, avoiding difficult problems with respect to proof in copyright law.7 Fixation will help ensure 
that “a copyright claimant will be able to provide a court documentary evidence”8 so that the court 
can determine if an infringement has occurred.9 Second, fixation serves public interests, making 
creative works perceivable and easier to be circulated.10 Having copyright works fixed, the society 
is able to avoid copying previous works; thus, they can be fully enriched from creative works.11 
 
5 Even with the Berne’s National Treatment, the United States is not obliged to discard the fixation requirement to 
conform with German copyright law. See Chapter 2.2. 
6 See Elizabeth White, The Berne Convention's Flexible Fixation Requirement: A Problematic Provision for User-
Generated Content, 13 CHI. J. INT'l L. 685 (2013) (contending that certain UGC may not surpass the “more than 
transitory time” test of fixation). 
7 See Douglas Lichtman, Copyright as a Rule of Evidence, 52 DUKE L.J. 683, 687 (2003).; See also Yoav Mazeh, 
Modifying Fixation: Why Fixed Works Need to Be Archived to Justify the Fixation Requirement, 8 LOY. L. & TECH. 
ANN. 109, 137 (2008). 
8 Russ VerSteeg, Copyright in the Twenty-First Century: Jurimetric Copyright: Future Shock for the Visual Arts, 13 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 132 (1994). 
9 MARSHALL LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 55-56 (3d ed. 1999). 
10 Lichtman, supra note 7, at 723. 
11 Mazeh, supra note 7, at 119. 
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Third, a fixation requirement helps distinguish authors who seek copyright protection from those 
who have copyright protection as an afterthought.12 It is observed that fixation does not create 
unreasonable burden to copyright seekers as fixation is cheap, easy, and intuitive for the author’s 
own interest.13 Therefore, fixation helps make sure that copyright law applies to “limited set of 
intellectual products” rather than “the ordinary stream of speech.”14  
Nonetheless, today’s American fixation requirement is argued to be not practically 
effective in serving these justifications. As it does not require a work to survive to the time of 
litigation,15 there is no point of differentiation at all between a work that has never been fixed and 
a work which has its medium destroyed. 16  Fixation, therefore, is not effectively capable of 
providing an evidence. Also, even if a work is fixed, without property keeping the fixed copy, 
neither the evidentiary nor the indication justifications are satisfied in case the copy is immediately 
disposed after being created.17 The third parties cannot identify the boundaries of the copyrighted 
content of the work that has lost its fixed copy, making them unable to enjoy the copyrighted work 
fully.18 
Moreover, the statutory requirement of authorship-as-fixation19, in fact, creates significant 
troubles for performers of creative work seeking copyright protection. Unlike Britain’s fixation 
requirement which does not limit the fixation authority solely to the author, the American version 
 
12 Lichtman, supra note 7, at 724. 
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 729. 
15 Id. at 732. (noting that the reason is to avoid imposing unreasonable burden to authors). 
16 Id. at 733. 
17 Mazeh, supra note 7, at 138. 
18 Id.  
19 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018) (stating that a work is “fixed” in a tangible medium of expression… by or under the 
authority of the author). 
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limits the authority of fixation to the authors only.20 This limitation only supports the author’s 
subjective value justification that helps indicate the works worth protected; however, it does not 
necessarily support the evidentiary and public interest purposes which can be satisfied as long as 
the works are fixed regardless of authority.21 The strict application of the authorship-as-fixation 
requirement rejects the efforts of performers of creative works in seeking copyright protection and, 
thus, is constitutionally questionable.22 The requirement of author’s authority for fixation may also 
lead to unwelcome ownership implications when a copyright issue is related to unconventional 
expressions of creativity. One example is the idea of setting up a camera for an animal to press the 
shutter, such as in Naruto v. Slater.23 Another example is the use of new surveillance technologies, 
including drones, Google Glasses, and new voyeurism recording devices, which make video 
recording easy and constant.24 Given that a minimal threshold of originality could somehow be 
proved by the person conducting the surveillance, granting him copyright protection might not be 
an ideal result for the creators of creative works that may have been recorded.25 Thus, “a strict 
authorship-as-fixation rule betrays copyright law's role in recognizing and rewarding creativity 
and denies copyright interests to the very individuals who have provided significant, if not the 
most important, original contributions to works within copyright's traditional subject matter.”26 
 
 
20 Mazeh, supra note 7, at 137. 
21 Id. 
22 John Tehranian, Sex, Drones & Videotape: Rethinking Copyright's Authorship-Fixation Conflation in the Age of 
Performance, 68 Hastings L.J. 1319, 1346 (2017) (the author finds that authorship-as-fixation is not explicitly 
expressed in the Constitution). 
23 See Naruto v. Slater, 888 F.3d 418 (9th Cir. 2018) (a copyright case where an animal rights organization, on 
behalf of Naruto the monkey, claimed authorship over photographs that monkey took of itself). 
24 Tehranian, supra note 22, at 1355.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 1370. 
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This thesis will argue further to support the proposition that the American fixation 
requirement needs to be readdressed. Specifically, the thesis suggests that fixation could be entirely 
discarded. In forming arguments, a comparative study of American copyright law with foreign 
copyright laws will be presented through Chapters 2, 3 and 4. Chapter 5 will emphasize the 
importance of protecting unfixed works, and Chapter 6 will discuss the roles of registration and 
deposition formalities under the American copyright regime. These discussions lead to a 
conclusion that copyright fixation in the United States may no longer be necessary. The conclusion 
is based on the following reasons.  
First, fixation is now having a hard time to fit in today’s word full of rapidly developing 
technologies, resulting in different courts interpreting the requirement differently. As the unsettled 
definition of fixation creates uncertainty of copyright protection, authors of creative works may 
end up feeling reluctant to express their ideas in an unconventional or traditional but unfixed 
artform. 
Second, the formalities of registration and deposition can replace the fixation requirement. 
All the said justifications of fixation discussed above can be satisfied by today’s registration and 
deposition formalities. To illustrate, when an author registers or deposits a work, he must provide 
the Copyright Office with at least one copy of his work. And a copy, by its nature, requires some 
kind of fixation. Although the roles of formalities have been reduced to the point that they are no 
longer a prerequisite to copyright protection, American authors are still more than highly 
incentivized to register and/or deposit their works. Thus, having fixation as a prerequisite to 
copyright protection is redundant.  
Third, by discarding the fixation requirement, authors will be given an opportunity to prove 
copyright ownership before a federal court once his unfixed work has been allegedly infringed. 
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Chances to prove copyright ownership over an unfixed work are common in civil law jurisdictions 
where fixation is not a copyright prerequisite. In light of promoting useful arts, authors of creative 























2. FIXATION THEN AND NOW 
Why do some countries require work to be fixed for copyright protection while some countries 
do not? Perhaps, part of the reasons lies in how copyright concepts originated and developed. This 
chapter briefly explores the two fundamental yet opposite concepts of early copyright laws. The 
presumption made in this Chapter is that a modern fixation requirement is a product of the 
embodiment emphasis of the early Anglo-American copyright that sought to protect copies of 
works. In contrast, the author's rights in their intellectual expression were regarded as critical 
during the French Revolution, when copyright statutes were born in France. The latter concept 
later became a model to "nearly all the copyright statutes except the Anglo-Saxon ones." 27 
Consequently, without binding provisions on fixation requirements under international law, 
countries that may have followed the French copyright conception tend to discard fixation as a 
requirement for copyright protection.  
2.1 Early Copyright Statutes 
2.1.1 Statue of Anne (1710) 
In the 15th Century, Gutenberg’s printing press was “the new technology” that introduced a 
new commercial activity: sales of published copies of books. The innovation allowed 
reproductions of literature to be made on a large scale for the first time.28 Considering literature as 
a “dangerous” art, the British Crown desired press control and, thus, assigned a monopolistic 
power to the Stationers’ Company. The controversy led to the conclusion of the Statute of Anne 
in 1710, which eventually put an end to the censorship system in England by giving back the 
authors’ copyrights.29  
 
27 Rudolf Monta, The Concept of Copyright versus the Droit D'Auteur, 32 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1959). 




As used at the time of the Statute of Anne, the term “copyright” was highly descriptive. The 
term referred to the exclusive rights of owners over “copies” of books to print and publish.30 The 
Statute titles itself “[a]n act for the encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed 
books in the authors or purchasers of such copies during the time therein mentioned.”31 The Statute 
conferred a reproduction right on an author for fourteen years which is renewable for another 
fourteen until his death.32 Without consent, printing, reprinting or importing of the book amount 
to an infringement.33  
Copies of books could be considered the primary protectable subject matter in the copyright 
world. At least during that time, copies could not be made by other means than employing writing, 
printing, or reprinting. As the Statute only granted authors rights over the copies of their writings, 
the works that had not been written down and were incapable of getting reprinted would be 
unprotected by the Statute. Therefore, books or copies were the only recognized copyright 
mediums back then, and the act of fixing or writing on those mediums was the key to copyright 
protection under the Statute of Anne. The concept of fixation, therefore, came into existence at the 
very moment the world’s first copyright statute was born.  
2.1.2 The Early American Copyright System 
The English Statute of Anne as an “incentive to authors to create so that the public may have 
access to and be enriched by their works” largely influenced the development of the American 
copyright system.34 Drafted in 1787, the United States Constitution resembled the underlying 
 
30 Id. at 3. 
31 Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, Ch. 19, at Title (emphasis added). 
32 Id. § 1. 
33 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 18. 
34 Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 Tul. L. 
Rev. 991, 998 (1990). 
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policy of the Statute of Anne with a clause stating that “Congress shall have power… to promote 
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries”.35 The intent of the Clause was later 
understood for the public benefits rather than primarily for the benefit of the author. 36  The 
“writings” are what Congress is authorized to protect37, not directly the “authors.”38  
Following the constitutional clause, the first U.S. Copyright Act was enacted in 1790. Maps, 
charts, and books were the first three subject matters protected by the Act,39 followed by musical 
compositions in 1831.40 The scope of protectable subject matters greatly expanded in 1909 to cover 
periodicals, prepared speeches, dramatic compositions, drawings, prints, photographs, and works 
of arts.41 Congress did not attempt to make an exhaustive listing and focused attention on the 
qualities of works creation process; as a result, the concept of fixation came into play.42 To this 
point, it is noticeable that all the historical media protected in the early U.S. copyright acts require 
fixation by nature. Courts and Congress had long recognized the fixation requirement before 




35 U.S. Const. art. 8, § 8, cl. 8. 
36 Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 999. 
37 Lichtman, supra note 7, at 718. 
38 Paul Goldstein, What is a Copyrighted Work – Why Does It Matter, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1175 (2011). 
39 Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124. 
40 Copyright Act of 1831, 4 Stat, 436 Chap. 16. 
41 Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 5.  
42 See Evan Brown, Fixed Perspectives: The Evolving Contours of the Fixation Requirement in Copyright Law, 10 
Wash. J.L. Tech. & Arts 17, 21 (2014). See also Chapter 2. 
43 Lichtman, supra note 7, at 719. 
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2.1.3 French Revolutionary Copyright  
French copyright law is the fruit of the French Revolution. In principle, it is “an exclusive 
right is conferred on authors because of their intellectual creation.”44 Somewhat similar to what 
happened in England before the Statute of Anne, a monopoly in printings had existed prior to the 
French Revolution.45 However, as opposed to Anglo-American copyright law as society-oriented, 
the French Revolution had developed a more author-oriented conception of copyright.46 In other 
words, while the U.S. copyright law is utilitarian and materialistic with focuses on protecting the 
pecuniary and exploitative interests, the French copyright law has a broader scope of protection 
that covers the author’s intellectual and moral interests.47 
There are two important Revolutionary copyright statutes; one enacted in 1791, followed by 
the second in 1793. These two statutes “served as the essential legal test” for the present French 
copyright law, the copyright statute of 1957—amended in 1985.48 The 1791 decree, however, did 
not center on the author’s right from the beginning. The decree’s underlying policy was to 
terminate a certain monopoly power that existed during the time by enlarging the public domain.49 
After the 1792 decree, which limited the authors’ rights with a burden to notify the public of their 
rights and shortening the protection term of many playwrights, there was a shift from the public 
domain principle toward a more author’s right approach in 1793.50 
 
44 Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 991-92. 
45 Monta, supra note 27, 178. 
46 Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 993. 
47 Jean-Luc Piotraut, An Author's Rights-Based Copyright Law: The Fairness and Morality of French and American 
Law Compared, 24 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 549, 551 (2006). 
48 Jane C. Ginsburg, French Copyright Law: A Comparative Overview, 36 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 269, 270 
(1989). 
49 Ginsburg, supra note 34, at 1006. 
50 Id. at 1009. 
 
 11 
Although having the same goal of advancing public interests, the Anglo-Saxon copyright law 
differs considerably from the French copyright law. An overall comparison suggests that while the 
former encourages utility, the latter promotes beauty.51 The primary subject matters under the early 
U.S. copyright statutes, as previously discussed, were protected in a pragmatic view of achieving 
the constitutional objective; therefore, they were “highly useful” productions.52 The 1793 French 
copyright law, on the other hand, protected both “writings of all kinds” and “all productions of the 
beaux-arts.”53 Consequently, theatrical plays were regarded as examples of historic copyright 
subject matters that the French Revolutionary law sought to protect.54 
2.2 The Berne Convention and Fixation Requirement 
Despite the two opposing approaches to copyright protection as discussed above, most 
copyright laws worldwide have been greatly harmonized through many international treaties on 
intellectual property. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, in 
particular, was concluded in 1886 in Berne, Switzerland, to provide a unified copyright standard 
to its member states.55 The Berne standard contains provisions ensuring the “minimum protection,” 
based on the three principles: “National Treatment,” “Independent Protection,” and “Automatic 
Protection.”56 Accordingly, formalities such as copyright notice and registration functioned as a 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 1015. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 1016 (“the utility of dramatic works in disseminating the Enlightenment and the Revolution” is stressed) 
55 WIPO-Administered Treaties, WIPO LEX (Aug. 19, 2020), 
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty_id=15 (currently, there are about one hundred and seventy-
nine members). 
56 Summary of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886), 
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/berne/summary_berne.html (last visited Sept 6, 2020). 
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tool of increasing evidentiary value to copyright works have to be partially removed pursuant to 
the latter principle.57  
However, with regard to the fixation requirement, Article 2(2) states that “[i]t shall, however, 
be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to prescribe that works in general or any 
specified categories of works shall not be protected unless they have been fixed in some material 
form.”58 The Article suggests a non-binding term, leaving the contracting parties to decide whether 
to impose a fixation requirement in their national laws for copyright protection of original works.59 
As a result, some countries require a work of authorship to be fixed to be entitled to protection, 
while many others do not have this requirement. Generally, jurisdictions with a civil law system 
do not incorporate fixation as a prerequisite for copyright protection, unlike the copyright regimes 
in common law countries.60 This difference leads to partial protection of the same work across 
jurisdictions, meaning that an unfixed work that receives copyright protection in a country of origin 
may not enjoy the same protection in foreign jurisdictions that have a fixation requirement. 
Although the partial protection issue has been eased by Berne’s National Treatment principle, 
countries with a fixation requirement are still not required to discard the requirement to protect 




57 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886), art. 5(2), 828 UN Treaty Ser 221 
[hereinafter Berne Convention].  
58 Id. art. 2(2) 
59 White, supra note 6, at 687. 
60 Elizabeth Adeney, Authorship and Fixation in Copyright Law: A Comparative Comment, 35 Melb. U. L. Rev. 
677, 689 (2011); see also JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 71 
61 White, supra note 6, at 690 (Berne’s Article 5(1) only requires countries of the Union other than the country of 
origin to grant the same rights they “grant to their nationals”). 
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3. JURISDICTIONS WITH NO FIXATION REQUIREMENT 
In this Chapter, copyright legislations under five jurisdictions will be briefly discussed. The 
first national copyright law is that of France, a nation with the most creator-approached version of 
this law.62 Another iteration to be presented, the Germany Copyright Act, falls under the same EU 
Directive. Moreover, to give a broader overview, copyright legislations of civil law countries in 
Asia—China and Thailand—will also be examined.  
Although all copyright statutes being discussed do not have fixation as a requirement for 
copyright protection, each country has different approaches in listing protectable subject matters. 
Importantly, their laws suggest that not all unfixed works are copyrightable. Some jurisdictions 
have statutory conditions of the medium of recordation on certain works. Some even have judicial 
interpretations that exclude certain unfixed works from copyright protection. Moreover, unlike the 
US jurisdiction, these four jurisdictions separate works protectable under related or neighboring 
rights from copyright subject matters. For the works that fall under the neighboring rights, fixation, 
most of the time, is a vital component. This requirement is found both in the EU under the Directive 
2001/29/EC63 and in the two Asian nations under discussion. Nonetheless, one will see that the 
copyright laws of these countries agree to suggest copyright protection over oral works, such as 
speeches and lectures, that have not been prepared in writing. As a result, there have been cases in 




62 Piotraut, supra note 47, at 553. 
63 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of 
Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society O.J. (L167), 10-19 (art. 2 stating initial 




Under the French jurisdiction, copyright work results from the creation of the mind and is, 
therefore, the most personal of all properties.64 This notion is reflected in the very first article of 
its copyright legislation, which states that "[t]he author of a work of the mind shall enjoy in that 
work, by the mere fact of its creation, property right which shall be enforceable against all 
persons.”65 Reading together with the following provision, which stipulates that work creation 
occurs "by the mere fact of realization,”66 another critical conclusion is formed—no other actions, 
except thinking, are required for a work to receive protection. And such protection shall be granted 
to “all works of the mind, whatever their kind, form of expression, merit or purpose.”67 The 
language of the law suggests that French copyright law is highly flexible in accommodating and 
adapting to new forms of expressions and technologies.68 Accordingly, works that do not have 
mediums are also entitled to protection. Speeches, addresses, sermons, and pleadings are 
protectable and are listed as protectable subject matters.69  
However, although the list is non-exhaustive, not everything is copyrightable; there is 
creativity or independent creation that demonstrates the expression of authors’ personality as a 
prerequisite for copyright protection.70 Moreover, the statute itself even imposes conditions on 
particular works. Choreographic works, circus acts and feats, and dumb-show works, in particular, 
 
64 Monta, supra note 27, at 178. 
65 Intellectual Property Code [Civil Code] art. L111-1 (Fr.) [hereinafter Fr. IP Code] 
66 Id. art. L111-2. 
67 Id. art. L112-1. 
68 Ginsburg, supra note 48, at 273. 
69 Fr. IP Code art. L112-2(2). 
70 Ginsburg, supra note 48, at 274. 
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need to be written down to be considered work of the mind.71 In fact, not everything falls within 
Article L112-1; in 2008, a court ruled that the fragrance of perfume was not a form of expression 
that could enjoy copyright protection. 72  Furthermore, there exists a fixation requirement for 
neighboring rights pursuant to the Directive. Unlike the US jurisdiction, in which sound recordings 
and motion pictures or audiovisual works are within the scope of copyright73, in France, these 
works fall in the neighboring rights regime in which producers have a responsibility for the initial 
fixation.74 
Nevertheless, due to the lack of a general fixation requirement for most works, the Court of 
Appeals in Marle c. Lacordaire 75  granted copyright protection over sermons. A copyright 
infringement was found for the defendant publisher, who transcribed and edited the sermons of 
the plaintiff without consent. For two reasons, the court emphasized the importance of protecting 
oral discourse as a copyrighted work. First, the author had the right to profit from his individual 
work, and, second, based on the author’s ‘personnalité morale’, “the author should always 
preserve the rights to revise and correct his own work, to survey the fidelity of the reproduction 
and to choose the time and mode of publication.”76 The court also stated further that: 
Because in effect the orator delivers his speech only, without giving up the 
power of disposal of his thought through printing; on the contrary it is 
essential for him to preserve the fruits of his labor, to remain the sole judge 
of the opportune moment for its publication and to keep guard against 
damaging alterations of his work.77 
 
71 Fr. IP Code art. L112-2(4). 
72 Court of Cassation, Civil, Commercial Division Jul. 1, 2008, 07-13.952 (Nov. 26, 2020), 
https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuriJudi&idTexte=JURITEXT000019127786&fast
ReqId=1714620208&fastPos=1. 
73 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2018). 
74 Fr. IP Code art. L211-4. 
75 Cou.* de Lyon, 17 Jul. 1845, D.1845.2.128. 
76 Id. at 129. 





Without a lengthy statutory language describing how a copyrighted work is created, the 
German Copyright Act protects “the author’s own intellectual creation,”78 and the author is simply 
“the creator of the work.”79 Similar to the French copyright jurisprudence, the scope of protection 
under the German copyright law extends to “intellectual and personal relationships to the work 
and in respect of the use of the work.”80 Although there exists no provision stating that the German 
copyright law protects works regardless of their form of expression like France’s, the fact that 
“speeches” are on the list of protectable subject matters81 implies that the German copyright 
jurisprudence does not incorporate fixation as a requirement for its copyright protection.82 Apart 
from that, there is no statutory condition of writing down for choreography works to be entitled to 
copyright protection as existed in the French law.83 In this instance, the language of the law alone 
suggests that the German law discards fixation to a greater extent than that of France. It is observed 
that the law requires a copyrighted work to exist in a perceptible form rather than a material form.84 
Still, a fixation requirement is a prerequisite for protecting particular works that fall within the 
related rights provisions in accordance with the Directive. 
Nonetheless, the Hamburg District Court has surprisingly rejected copyright protection on the 
ground of a lack of fixation as it addressed whether artists could be considered as “art” within the 
meaning of the copyright act. While not directly stated in the language of the law, the court found 
 
78 Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Civil Act] § 2(2) (Ger.). 
79 Id. § 1. 
80 Id. § 11. 
81 Id. § 2(1). 
82 See also White, supra note 6, at 696. 
83 UrhG § 2(1). 
84 Adeney, supra note 60, at 682. 
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“[n]o copyright protection because artists and work are identical. There is no fixation that can be 
separated from the person of the author. There is no property right in in the person.”85 Thus, one 
might find that although the copyright act of Germany does not mention fixation, the courts may 
possibly find the need for fixation in some instances. 
3.3 China 
The copyright law in China is ambiguous whether fixation is needed for a work to be protected 
by the law.86 While Article 3 of the Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China expressly 
states that oral works are to be protected87, Article 2 of the Implementing Regulations limits 
copyright protection to the works capable of being reproduced in a tangible form.88 Defining oral 
works, Article 4(2) of the Implementing Regulations states, “oral works are works which are 
created in spoken words and have not been fixed on any material carrier, such as impromptu 
speeches, lectures and court debates.”89 Thus, it is suggested that works that can be fixed but are 
not yet done, are eligible for copyright protection.90 Supporting this suggestion, Beijing Haidian 
District Court, in 2006, granted copyright protection over English teacher’s lectures and found the 
defendant’s unauthorized recording and distributing the class instructions in the forms of MP3 files 
 
85 AG (Local Court) Hamburg, Aug. 18, 1998, 1998 ZUM 1047 (rejected copyright protection in the live static 
performance; thus, artists Eva & Adele as “living sculptures” are not artistic works). 
86 1 International Copyright Law and Practice CHI § 2[1][a] (2019) [hereinafter ICPL] (Nov. 26, 2020), 
https://plus.lexis.com/api/permalink/f2acf8d0-0ced-4566-b205-dd307c089cdc/?context=1530671  
87 Copyright Law of the People’s Republic of China [Civil Code] art. 3(2) (China). 
88 Implementing Regulations of the Copyright Law of the People's Republic of China [Civil Code] art. 2 (China). 
89 Id. art. 4(3) (emphasis added). 
90 ICPL § 2[1][a]. 
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a copyright infringement.91 With regard to computer programs, however, the Software Regulations 
specifically require fixation in a tangible medium for the works to be protected.92 
3.4 Thailand 
Enacted in 1994, the Thai Copyright Act protects works of authorship “regardless of the 
method or form in which such works are expressed.”93 Unlike jurisdictions discussed above, the 
list of subject matters under Thai copyright law is definitive.94 As Section 4 of the Act expanding 
the exhaustive list with detailed definitions to each subject matter terminology, one can, 
accordingly, find protectable unfixed works in the language of the Act. Literary works within the 
meaning of the Act include lectures, sermons, addresses, and speeches. 95  Moreover, 
“choreography, dancing, gesturing, or a performance which is made up as a story, and shall include 
a mime performance” are included within the scope of copyright protectable dramatic works.96 
Thus, legal scholars have concluded that upon an expression of an idea or performance in a 
choreography work, even without labanotation, the work is immediately protected by the Thai 
Copyright Act.97 Nonetheless, there is a fixation condition on audiovisual, cinematographic works, 
sound recordings, and photos.98 These works fall in the copyright protection sphere and are not 
 
91 Luo Yonghao v. Beijing Silicon Valley Power Electronic Commerce Co. Ltd., Beijing Haidian District Court 
(2006), Case No. 9749. 
92 ICPL § [4][d]. 
93 Copyright Act [Civil Act] § 6 (Thai.), [hereinafter TCA], 
http://web.krisdika.go.th/data/outsitedata/outsite21/file/COPYRIGHT_ACT_1994.pdf. 
94 Id. (protectable works include literary works, dramatic works, artistic works, musical works, audiovisual works, 
cinematographic works, sound recordings, broadcasts, and any other work in the literary, scientific or artistic field) 
95 Id. § 4 
96 Id. § 4  
97 See Nick Soonthondai, Choreography and Copyright: Taken for Granted (ลิขสิทธิในงานนาฏกรรม: ความสําคญัทีถูกมองขา้ม) 93, 
94 (2004) (Nov. 26, 2020), http://journal.hcu.ac.th/pdffile/soc71410.pdf. 
98 TCA § 4 
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under the related right provisions.99 As the stated works require fixation by their nature already, 
the law does not impose any additional burdens to authors. 
In Supreme Court Decision no. 13159/2555, the Thai Supreme Court determined whether the 
plaintiff, an actor hired to entertain a meeting, was entitled to the performer’s rights. To grant the 
stated right, the Court must first analyze the copyrightability of the work behind the plaintiff’s 
performance. In doing so, it only took into consideration the content in such performance whether 
it falls into any subject matters listed under the Copyright Act. At the meeting, although the 
plaintiff engaged in singing and dancing, the plaintiff, for the most part, was responsible for 
interviewing guests and hosting activities. As a result, the Court found that such performance was 
for mere entertainment, and there was neither actual musical works nor works of choreography 
within the meaning of copyright law involved. 100  Although the Court rejected the plaintiff 
performer’s rights as there was no copyrightability over the content performed, it is worth noting 










99 Related rights provisions are included from Chapter 2 of TCA, which govern the rights of performers only. 
100 Supreme Court Decision no. 13159/2555 (Thai.). 
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4. THE UNITED STATES AND ITS FIXATION REQUIREMENT 
Unfixed oral works such as sermons and lectures protectable by copyright law in the above 
civil jurisdictions may not enjoy the copyright law's protection in common law jurisdictions. In 
the United States, the current copyright regime is governed by the Copyright Act of 1976, codified 
in Title 17 of the United States Code as a federal law, which explicitly contains fixation as a 
copyright prerequisite.101 Therefore, works that are not fixed—though they may be eligible for 
“common law copyright,” which is state-created law—are not entitled to federal copyright 
protection.102  
4.1 Fixation as a prerequisite for Federal Copyright Protection 
For a work to receive federal copyright protection, it needs to satisfy two requirements: 
originality and fixation.103 The originality requirement is embodied in the statutory phrase original 
works of authorship.104 Such works, however, do not need “novelty, ingenuity, or [a]esthetic merit 
and there is no intention to enlarge the standard of copyright protection to require them…”105 The 
first prerequisite, in fact, is determined upon whether there exist an author’s independent creation 
and a modest quantum of creativity.106 To pass this requirement, the work in question cannot be a 
mere “idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery…”107. 
 
101 See 107 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). 
102 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 14. 
103 Lichtman, supra note 7, at 716. 
104 107 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018). 
105 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476 at 51-52. 
106 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 72. 
107 107 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2018). 
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The second prerequisite, fixation, acts in a manner of a trigger for federal copyright 
protection for works that pass the authorship requirement.108 Section 101 stipulates that “[a] work 
is ‘created’ when it is ‘fixed’ in a copy or phonorecord for the first time…”. Section 102(a) grants 
copyright protection to “works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.” In other 
words, there is no federal copyright protection for work unless the work is fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.109 However, during one’s daily life, the requirement is not so unfamiliar. 
“[C]opyright is created every time people set pen to paper or fingers to keyboard and affix their 
thoughts in a tangible medium…”, stated the Second Circuit.110     
As previously discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of fixation had long been associated with 
the U.S. copyright regime. The Copyright Act of 1909, for instance, hid the requirement in Section 
4 which states “[that] the works for which copyright may be secured under this Act shall include 
all the writings of an author.”111 Nowadays, under the current Act of 1976, the fixation requirement 
is directly associated with the constitutional language of the Copyright Clause, which secures “for 
limited times to authors… the exclusive rights to their respective writings.”112 The Constitution's 
latter-day writings are illustrated by the definition of "copies" and "fixed."113 As a result, given 
that a work is “embodied in a physical form capable of being copied,” such work is entitled to be 
 
108 Lichtman, supra note 7, at 717. 
109 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 54. 
110 In re World Auxiliary Power Co., 303 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2002).
111 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60, 349, § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (1909). (emphasis added). 
112 U.S. Const. Art. 8 § 8 Cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
113 Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. v. W. Pub. Co., 158 F.3d 693, 704 (2d Cir. 1998). 
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constitutional writing.114 In other words, writing under the constitutional extends “to include any 
physical rendering of the fruits of creative intellectual or aesthetic labor.”115 
 As the current U.S. Copyright Act does not provide an exhaustive list of copyrightable 
subject matters, fixation correspondingly becomes a gatekeeper to federal copyright protection. 
Without a concrete definition of fixation, a complex issue arises as to whether work at hand 
satisfies the fixation requirement and is, therefore, protected by the copyright law. Authors would 
have difficulty claiming copyright protection for their works, especially when the mediums are not 
the traditional writings. Moreover, apart from the copyrightability side, fixation is a crucial factor 
in the infringement analysis. As a copyright owner’s exclusive right to reproduction under Section 
106(1) prevents unauthorized copying,116 an alleged infringing work also needs to be fixed to 
constitute an unauthorized copy. 
4.2 Unsettled Definition of Fixation 
An on-going issue of implementing fixation as a copyright prerequisite is that as 
technologies keep developing, the definition of fixation must keep up with the technological 
change to serve its function properly. Failure to adapt to the new technology and artforms could 
potentially discourage authors from exploring new means of creative expression. In 1908, the US 
Supreme Court, in White-Smith v. Apollo,117 limited the medium on which a work can be fixed to 
only those perceivable by humans. In response to how new technology has changed the way people 
perceive arts, Congress overturned White-Smith v. Apollo with Section 102(a) of the Copyright 
 
114 Capitol Records, Inc. v. Mercury Records Corp., 221 F.2d 657, 664 (2d Cir. 1955) (Judge Hand dissented in part 
favoring copyright eligibility of sound recordings). 
115 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973). 
116 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2018) (stating that the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords). 
117 White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908) [hereinafter White-Smith]. 
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Act of 1976, which extends the requirement of fixation to be whatever perceivable with the aids 
of a machine or device. In 1982, both the Third Circuit, in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int’l, 
Inc,118 and the Seventh Circuit, in Midway v. Artic,119 agreed that intangible copies of inherently 
changing digital works in ROM, a computer memory component, constitute sufficient copyright 
fixation. Nonetheless, conflicts started when considering fixation with another computer memory 
device called RAM. While the Ninth Circuit, in MAI Systems Corps. v. Peak Computer Inc,120 
ruled that data stored in RAM surpasses the “more than transitory duration” requirement under 
Section 101, the Second Circuit in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc.121 disagreed. The 
Cartoon Network’s strict “more than transitory duration” requirement poses difficulties in seeking 
copyright protection over non-conventional art forms, especially when the mediums are perishable.  
Respectively, the Seventh Circuit, in Kelly v. Chicago Park District,122 and the Central District 
Court of California, in Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers,123 denied fixation of sculptural works in 
forms of gardens and a food bowl respectively.  
4.2.1 Perceptibility 
The first case brought into discussion is White-Smith v. Apollo.124 Decided before the 1796 
Copyright Act was enacted, it is an early example showing the judicial disinclination to deal with 
new technologies on information storage.125 The issue presented before the court was whether a 
 
118 Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Intern., Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Williams]. 
119 Midway Mfg. Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 547 F. Supp. 999 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983) 
[hereinafter Midway]. 
120 MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) [hereinafter MAI]. 
121 Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) [hereinafter Cartoon Network]. 
122 Kelley v. Chicago Park Dist., 635 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 2011) [hereinafter Kelly]. 
123 Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1046 (C.D. Cal. 2011) [hereinafter Kimseng]. 
124 White-Smith, supra note 117.
125 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 54. 
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copy needed to be perceivable only by humans, as the lawsuit was brought by a composer of two 
certain musical compositions published in the form of sheet music, namely ‘Little Cotton Dolly’ 
and ‘Kentucky Babe’ against the company, Apollo Records. The defendant, Apollo, engaged in 
distributing a ‘players piano’ invention called the “Apollo” and perforated rolls of music 
embodying the two compositions used in connection therewith. These rolls in question were 
designed to be used specifically with the Apollo device, making them not capable of being read 
by skilled performers as ordinary pieces of music.  
The appellant, the composers, argued that musical composition was “the thing which 
Congress intended to protect and that such protection covers all means of expression of the order 
of the notes which produce the air or melody which the composer has invented.”126 The Supreme 
Court, however, narrowed the definition of copy of a musical composition to “a written or printed 
record of it in intelligible notation.”127 For musical composition, the court gave this definition: “is 
not susceptible of being copied until it has been put in a form which others can see and read.”128 
Thus, although the perforated rolls can produce musical tones when used with the adapted 
mechanism, “…we cannot think they are copies within the meaning of the copyright act,” said 
Justice Day.129 
This decision, however, was later overturned by the language of the 1976 Copyright Act 
in which Section 102(a) stipulates that fixation occurs on “any tangible medium of expression” 
that is “now known or later developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or 
 
126 White-Smith, supra note 117, at 11. 
127 Id. at 17. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 18. 
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otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”130 Congress 
specifically wrote this provision to avoid “artificial and largely justifiable distinctions” like the 
one from White-Smith that put copyrightability of a work upon the form or medium in which the 
work is fixed.131 This open-ended language’s intention was to accommodate new technologies and 
art forms; nonetheless, it still led to conflicts of court decisions later on. 
In addition to Section 102(a), the Copyright Act of 1976 also brings Section 101 to help 
identify the occurrence of fixation. The provision states that “[a] work is ‘fixed’ in a tangible 
medium of expression when its embodiment in a copy or phonorecord... is sufficiently permanent 
or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more 
than transitory duration”. 132  However, as technology and artistic ideas have expanded, the 
statutory language has been questioned from time to time. To what extent does the law require a 
medium to be perceivable, reproducible, or communicable? In particular, what it means by having 
a work fixed in a medium that can last for a “transitory duration” is still debatable. Different courts 
have interpreted the phrase differently.  
4.2.2 Intangible copies  
The two court decisions presented in this subsection attempted to answer whether an 
inherently changeable digital work could be fixed by virtue of Section 102(a), in particular when 
there is interactivity as an element. Firstly, in Williams Electronics, Inc. v. Artic Int’l, Inc.133, the 
case was brought by the producer of an early arcade game “Defender” against Artic International 
 
130 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2018) (emphasis added) 
131 H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 52-53 (1976) 
132 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). (emphasis added) 
133 Williams, supra note 118. 
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on the ground of unauthorized replication of the video game. The plaintiff, Williams Electronics, 
manufactured video game machines operated by electronic circuit boards having tiny chips called 
ROMs (Read Only Memory) as part of the circuit.134 According to Judge Newman, ROMs function 
in this fashion: 
The (ROM) stores the instructions and data from a computer 
program in such a way that when electric current passes through the 
circuitry, the interaction of the program stored in the (ROM) with 
the other components of the game produces the sights and sounds of 
the audiovisual display that the player sees and hears. The memory 
devices determine not only the appearance and movement of the 
(game) images but also the variations in movement in response to 
the player's operation of the hand controls.135 
 
One of the subjects of the dispute was the copyrightability of audiovisual elements in the 
video game. The arcade had two modes: the “attract mode” and the “play mode.” The former gives 
examples of a fixed set of sounds and animations of what Defender would be like when the game 
was played. The latter, however, shows a series of sounds and animations interactively with the 
player inputs. Although the plaintiff had registered audiovisual works of the two modes with the 
Copyright Office, the defendant contended that there could be no copyright protection in either 
game modes since the works fail to meet the fixation requirement.136 According to Artic, fixation 
could not occur since a “new” series of images and sounds generate each time when each mode is 
displayed.137 
 
134 Id. at 873. 
135 Id. at 872 (citing Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 854 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
136 Id. at 873. 
137 Id. at 874. 
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The Third Circuit, nonetheless, had little difficulty rejecting the defendant’s contention.138 
The court agreed with the Second Circuit in Stern Electronics139 in finding that the same pattern 
of images and sound newly appearing each time in the attract mode satisfies the statutory provision 
of “audiovisual works.” Even in the play mode, the court found identifiable expression from the 
claimed audiovisual works. Although player interaction causes changes in presentation from one 
game to the next, “there is always a repetitive sequence of a substantial portion of the sights and 
sounds of the game, and many aspects of the display remain constant from game to game regardless 
of how the player operates the controls.”140 Importantly, the game’s memory devices (ROMs) are 
capable of, for the audiovisual works in dispute, constituting a “copy” in which the work is 
“fixed.”141 The defendant was, therefore, liable for copying the game. 
Similarly, in the following year, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision 
in Midway v. Artic,142 which ruled in favor of the plaintiff against Artic for copyright infringement 
of two video games: Galaxian and Pac-man. Artic, the same defendant from Williams Electronics, 
used a similar contention that neither the attract mode nor the play mode could produce 
copyrightable audiovisual works. The defendant specifically argued that the audiovisual aspects 
were not “fixed in any tangible medium of expression.”143 Artic noted that the ROMs in the games 
circuit board did not have enough memory to store all audiovisual information at an instant; 
therefore, the ROMs were basically generating a new set of pictures all the time.144 The court found 
 
138 Brown, supra note 42, at 23. 
139 Stern Elecs., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 885-56 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter Stern]. 
140 Williams, supra note 118, at 874 (citing Stern, supra note 162, at 885-86). 
141 Id. 
142 Midway, supra note 119. 




the Artic’s argument fails to meet validity by recognizing the disputed works to be capable of 
being reproduced with the aid of a machine or device in line with Section 102(a).145 Moreover, the 
ROM in question is a later-developed medium of expression, which the Congress has allowed 
fixation to occur through Section 102(a).146  
The two aforementioned cases opened that the gate for the fixation requirement to stand in 
the world of digital technology, where copies of copyright works might not exist in the physical 
sense. As a result, fixation no longer became an obstacle to digital works to get federal copyright 
protection.147 However, what Midway left behind was a question of what exactly is the “transitory 
duration” that a digital copy needs to last.148 After Midway, there have been many attempts to 
resolve such a question, which will be discussed below. 
4.2.3 Temporary reproductions 
The cases illustrated in this sub-section deals explicitly with a temporary storage 
technology called RAM. They tried to answer whether data stored in this storage could “be 
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration” 
as required by Section 101. Unlike the two court decisions above that are in harmony, the following 
ruling resulted in controversy. In short, they are not in line whether the phrase “more than transitory 
duration” could be overcome by a “functional” test or should be interpreted strictly with a 
specification of time. 
 
145 Id. at 1008. 
146 Id. 
147 Brown, supra note 42, at 23. 
148 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 66. 
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MAI Systems Corps. v. Peak Computer Inc.149 is one of the early cases in which courts tried 
to work with the statutory requirement of Section 101 for digital copies. MAI, the owner of 
copyrighted computer programs, brought legal action against Peak, who operated a computer 
maintenance business on the ground of unauthorized reproductions of MAI’s works in the course 
of Peak’s repair service. Specifically, the plaintiff contended that its computer programs were to 
be licensed for personal use, which included necessary internal processing such as loading the 
works into the computer’s random access memory (“RAM”).150 Thus, the plaintiff claimed that 
“any copying” done by Peak was beyond the scope of the license, alleging Peak for making 
unauthorized copies.151 
The significant dispute that followed the claim was whether loading the plaintiff’s software 
into RAM involves fixation that would constitute copying under the Copyright Act. RAM 
functions by manipulating digital data store in a computer’s permanent storage;152 however, the 
data loaded into it can be perceived, reproduced, and otherwise communicated only when the 
power is on. 153  When switched off, the data stored in RAM immediately disappears. 154 
Considering that the stored data do not last for a transitory duration, the defendant disputed the 
district court decision, which holds that copying had occurred within the meaning of the Copyright 
Act.155 
 
149 MAI, supra note 120. 
150 Id. 517. 
151 Id. 
152 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 476 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 MAI, supra note 120, at 517. 
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The Ninth Circuit, nevertheless, affirmed the district court’s decision in this regard—
notwithstanding that RAM was designed to be a temporary storage medium.156 According to the 
court, the reproductions did not need to be absolutely permanent for a copyright infringement 
analysis. Instead, “sufficient permanence” was considered with the fact that the reproductions in 
RAM were held long enough for the defendant to achieve the computer diagnose purpose.157 Thus, 
the data stored there were adequately shown as being able to “perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.”158 The ruling of the Ninth Circuit 
was, therefore, said to be a “functional” standard as the court considers a reproduction “fixed” 
when it makes intended actions possible.159 
 Many courts after MAI have agreed with the Nine Circuit.160 Not long after MAI, the 
Eastern District of Virginia in Advanced Computer Service of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Systems 
Corp161 was presented with the very same question—whether a reproduction in RAM constitutes 
copying. MAI’s “functional” standard was again adopted by the Advanced district court in 
concluding that the contents in RAM were “fixed.”162 Although the Advanced court found the 
occurrence of fixation, it agreed with the defendant, a computer maintenance service provider, that 
the data stored in RAM were “ephemeral” and “transitory.”163 Moreover, in 1995, the district court 
 
156 See Joshua C. Liederman, Changing the Channel: The Copyright Fixation Debate, 36 Rutgers COMPUTER & 
TECH. L.J. 289, 290 (2010). 
157 Id. 
158 MAI, supra note 120, at 518. 
159 Liederman, supra note 156, at 299. 
160 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 478. 
161 Advanced Computer Servs. of Michigan, Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
162 Liederman, supra note 156, at 300. 
163 Id.  
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in Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc164 extended the 
MAI doctrine beyond computer programs to the information posted on an electronic bulletin 
billboard service ("BBS"). In line with the Ninth Circuit’s “functional” test in MAI, the district 
court held that, even though the contents remained in the system for eleven days at maximum, they 
were capable of being perceived and thus, were sufficiently fixed.165 
 Nonetheless, MAI was significantly challenged in the Second Circuit's more recent 
decision in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc. 166  The disputed technology in Cartoon 
Network was an invention of the defendant, Cablevision, called “Remote Storage” Digital Video 
Recorder system (“RS-DVR.”) The technology is known as “buffer” and is, again, considered a 
type of RAM.167 Acting as working memory, a buffer temporarily holds data that are automatically 
being overwritten by new sets of data at all times.168 The Second Circuit, with the attempt of 
imposing a strict “duration requirement” to the definition of “fixed,” ruled that the information 
contained in the buffer was not fixed as “no bit of data remains on any buffer more than a fleeting 
1.2 seconds.”169 The court rejected Cartoon Network’s contention, which adhered to the MAI 
“functional” test that the data stored in the buffer were not transitory, as they lasted long enough 
for Cablevision to make unauthorized reproductions.170 
 The Cartoon Network’s “1.2-second rule” has been widely criticized. If a “more than 
transitory duration” requires more than 1.2 seconds, the following question would be how long 
 
164 Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995) 
165 Id. at 1368. 
166 Cartoon Network, supra note 121. 
167 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 477. 
168 Id.  
169 Cartoon Network, supra note 121, at 129-30. 
170 Id. at 30. 
 
 32 
precisely the statute would need. In SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc., the court 
mentioned that Cartoon Network suggested a RAM work to last for “at least several minutes … or 
until the computer is shut off.171 Criticism of the strict application of the rule is that it would not 
follow technology's rapid development. Slingbox, for instance, allows users to stream videos 
without saving them into the computer's permanent storage and gives users the ability to control 
the buffering process and the length of time the video remains in the buffers.172 Moreover, Cartoon 
Network is a direct conflict in connection with a 2001 DMCA Copyright Office report which states 
that in the context of determining fixation of digital copies, “attempting to draw a line based on 
duration may be impossible … both in theory and as a matter of proof in litigation.”173  
 In addition to the Copyright Office, other non-judicial entities have been trying to resolve 
digital reproductions' complex issues. The Commission on New Technological Uses of 
Copyrighted Works (“CONTU”), for instance, has issued its final report agreeing that data stored 
in RAM can be considered fixed; however, to keep up with how the technology operates, 
exceptions are to be granted herewith.174 Consequently, Section 117 was replaced with Section 
117(a) and (b) in 1980.175 Section 117(a) essentially permits reproductions of computer programs 
by an owner of a licensed copy, given that they are essential to computer operations.176 After that, 
 
171 SimplexGrinnell LP v. Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc., 642 F. Supp. 2d 167 (S.D.N.Y.), modified on 
reconsideration, 642 F. Supp. 2d 206 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) at 189. 
172 Liederman, supra note 156, at 318. 
173 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT art. v (2001), at 113, 
https://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf. 
174 National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), Final Report on the 
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, 3 Computer L.J. 53, 13 (1981), 
https://repository.law.uic.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1573&context=jitpl.  
175 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 477. 
176 See 17 U.S.C. § 117(a) (2018). 
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in 1998, the specific holding in MAI was overturned by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.177 
Section 117(c) was added to exempt temporary productions for purposes of computer maintenance 
or repair.178 Reading Section 117(c) could imply that Congress supports MAI’s proposition that 
ephemeral copies in RAM may constitute unauthorized reproductions under Section 106(1).179  
 Still, to avoid Cartoon Network's strict duration standard by following the "functional" test 
as stipulated in MAI, one must face complex issues arising, especially nowadays when the internet 
is part of everyone’s life. Suppose MAI is to become the prevailing standard. In that case, it may 
create unreasonable risks to every user in an email chain that contains infringing copyright 
materials as email users cannot avoid short-lived reproductions of the contents.180 Moreover, the 
mere act of reading infringing works on a website may already impose the reader with 
unauthorized reproduction liabilities, as what appears on the web site is automatically stored in the 
user computer’s RAM and even hard drive in certain cases.181  
4.2.4 Non-static media 
Difficulty in defining a ‘fixed’ work does not only reside in the digital world. Physical 
objects, in fact, can also pose complex fixation problems. Time and change bring not only new 
technologies to the world but also introduce new artforms. In Kelly v. Chicago Park District, the 
subject in dispute, presented before the Seventh Circuit, was a garden called “Wildflower Works,” 
which Kelly, the plaintiff, promoted as a “living art.”182 Defining this unconventional art form, 
Kelly, with his art history expert witness, contended that “Wildflower Works” is both a painting 
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and a sculpture within the purposes of the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA). 183  Thus, by 
modifying the garden, the plaintiff alleged that the Park District violated his right to moral right or 
the right to “integrity” over the work protected under the Act.  
 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals found that the work was not entitled to protection under 
VARA, as Wildflower Works did not satisfy the authorship and fixation copyright requirements.184 
Unlike a landscape design of a garden plan, which is put in writing, the garden itself is not a fixed 
copy of the gardener’s intellectual property.185 The planting material is not “stable or permanent 
enough to be called ‘fixed.’” While rejecting “absolute” permanence, the court stated: 
Seeds and plants in a garden are naturally in a state of perpetual change; 
they germinate, grow, bloom, become dormant, and eventually die. This 
life cycle moves gradually, over days, weeks, and season to season, but 
the real barrier to copyright here is not temporal but essential. The 
essence of a garden is its vitality, not its fixedness. It may endure from 
season to season, but its nature is one of dynamic change.186 
 
 Although the Seventh Circuit did not further rule that fixation was incompatible with all 
other inherently non-static media, there has been at least one court decision that extended Kelly’s 
reasoning beyond plants.187 In Kim Seng Co. v. J & A Importers, an arrangement of food was 
brought to the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to decide whether it would 
pass the copyrightability analysis. The plaintiff, a Chinese food supply company, brought a lawsuit 
against its competitor, J&A Importers. The plaintiff contended that the defendant infringed its 
copyright by using a photo of arranged Vietnamese rice sticks on the food products packaging.188 
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The right over the photograph in dispute was said to be transferred from a third-party photographer. 
Additionally, the plaintiff claimed copyright ownership through its creative contribution to the 
picture, which is a product of a derivative work.189 The underlying bowl-of-food “sculpture” was 
created by an employee of the plaintiff who arranged a bowl of Asian noodles from egg rolls, 
grilled meat, and other garnishes.190 
Regarding the derivative work claim, the court found no copyrightability over the 
underlying sculpture. However, the case did not pass the originality test; the court was not 
persuaded by the plaintiff’s contention that the employees “chose the foods out of thousands of 
possibilities, and directed their arrangement to be in a certain fashion out of infinite 
possibilities.”191 Furthermore, the court ruled that even if there had been originality, there would 
not have been enough evidence to support that the food bowl has passed the fixation 
requirement.192 The court cited Kelly as precedent and compared a bowl of food with a garden; it 
found that the nature of food was “inherently changeable” and would ultimately perish.193 In 
conclusion, the court stated that “if the fact that the Wildflower Works garden reviving itself each 
year was not sufficient to establish its fixed nature, a bowl of food which, once it spoils is gone 
forever, cannot be considered “fixed” for the purposes.”194  
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that in Kim Seng, the food, though perishable, had already 
been depicted in a photograph, which enabled the work to be capable of being perceived and 
identified. Thus, the justifications behind fixation discussed in Chapter 1 have all been met—the 
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author had expressed his desire to protect the work by hiring a third-party photographer, and 
photographs were capable of serving evidentiary and public interest purposes. Yet, the plaintiff 
lost its copyright over the sculptural work of food bowl. Notwithstanding the separate issue of 
copyright ownership over the photograph, it was fair to argue that the perishable bowl of food had 
already been fixed in the picture, making the food arrangement perceptible later. Moreover, it is 
questionable whether fixation is convenient and cheap, as observed.195 If taking photos cannot 
suffice the fixation of sculptural works of food arrangement, would the authors need to create food 
models for fixation? If that was to be the case, fixation, indeed, imposes a significant burden upon 
certain authors. 
4.2.5 Human body as medium 
  Apart from food, human bodies are unarguably perishable. The Copyright Act itself 
recognizes this very fact by using an author’s life as a part of copyright protection terms.196 
Interestingly, in Whitmill v. Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc., 197  the plaintiff, who inked a 
registered tattoo called “Tribal Tattoo” for boxer Mike Tyson, sued Warner Bros, the defendant, 
for infringingly copied the tattoo. In the complaint, the plaintiff stated that he had never licensed 
anyone to use such a design, yet the movie "Hangover 2" depicted the said design's exact 
reproduction.198 According to the plaintiff, the tattoo design had been registered at the Copyright 
Office and passed the originality and fixation requirements, therefore entitling him valid copyright 
over the work.199 By copying the original tattoo from Tyson’s face to an actor’s face, the plaintiff 
 
195 Lichtman, supra note 7, at 724 (noting that fixation is cheap and easy) 
196 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) which grants copyright protection to post-1978 works the life of the author plus 
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197 Civ. No. 11-cv-752 (E.D. Mo., filed Apr.28, 2011). 
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alleged that the defendant had constituted an initially unauthorized reproduction.200 Ultimately, 
however, the movie was allowed to be released, and the parties settled the case.201  
 If the litigation had continued, it would have been interesting to see how the court would 
have touched upon the disputed work's copyrightability analysis. A critical question that could be 
raised is whether Tyson's face is a part of the plaintiff's tattoo elements. Note that in Chapter 3, the 
German Hamburg District Court found no fixation in which the art in question and the artist were 
inseparable. Similarly, the Seventh Circuit, in Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., found no 
copyrightability of a person’s persona.202 The court of appeals ruled that a person’s likeness was 
not a work of authorship and was not fixed.203 A human body cannot be a medium within the 
purposes of the Copyright Act for a persona accordingly. 
Given that tattoo is an art that can exist per se, a human body could be deemed a medium 
on which the work is expressed. If that is to be the case, the court may have to consider whether 
this perishable medium—human’s facial skin—is adequate for fixation purposes under the 
Copyright Act. One may argue that human flesh, although perishable, is not inherently changeable 
in the way food does and is not in a state of perpetual change, as are seeds and plants. Nonetheless, 
what if a person, unfortunately, passes away the day after he got a tattoo? The corpse may be able 
to bear the tattoo in perfect shape only for a week or even a few days in some cases. Would this 
incident possibly be a tragedy for both the deceased and the tattoo artist?  
From a more philosophical perspective, is there such an object that do not ultimately perish? 
Even books, the world first recognized copyright mediums, are perishable at some point. Whether 
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something is “inherently changeable” or “being in a state of perpetual change” or not is 
philosophically relative and, perhaps, using them as a legal test might not be the most ideal solution 























5. UNFIXED WORKS AND LIMITED PROTECTION 
If the strict Cartoon Network’s “more than transitory duration test” discussed above is 
becoming a prevailing rule, it will exclude a great quantity of contemporary art from federal 
copyright protection. This is due to the fact that contemporary artists do not focus on the tangible 
products but define the process itself as the art’s core.204 Examples of excluded creative works 
include sculptural works with natural media such as land art using natural objects205, performance 
arts in which an artist’s body is a part of the art206, and sculptural works composed of living things 
or the so-called “bioart.” 207  That is because these works would be deemed unfixed. The 
consequence is that the strict “more than transitory duration test” would leave many contemporary 
artists with neither economic nor moral rights—negating the constitutional copyright purpose of 
useful arts promotion. 208  Apart from contemporary artists, authors of spontaneous works, 
including jazz musicians, stand-up comedians209, or even university lecturers210 may also lose the 
remedies available under the federal copyright regime. Is it fair to exclude only this specific group 
of authors from receiving copyright protection to which other groups of artists are entitled? As 
justifications for protecting fixed works have already been presented prior, the following argument 
will explore the federal copyright protection of unfixed creation. Here, improvisational musical 
 
204 Megan Carpenter & Steven Hetcher, Function over Form: Bringing the Fixation Requirement into the Modern 
Era, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2221, 2228 (2014). 
205 See Id. 
206 See Id. at 2230. 
207 See Id. at 2232. 
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works such as solos in jazz music will be used for the purpose of argument illustration.211 One will 
see that these works are the products of the authors’ labor and can be misappropriated not less than 
fixed works are. 
5.1 Rhetorics of Copyright  
5.1.1 The Rhetoric of Natural Rights 
John Locke, a 17th Century English philosopher, introduced the concept of “natural rights,” 
which conveys a proposition that an individual is entitled to reap the fruits of his or her creation 
or labor. 212  Based on physical property, Locke’s labor theory contends that by combining 
“common” things with one’s labor, one owns as his private property what was once in common.213 
Although many scholars are reluctant to connect this conception to intellectual property theory214, 
Locke’s labor model played a role in creating the Statute of Anne in 1710. 215 Therefore, as 
introduced in Chapter 2 that the Statute was the model for the American copyright law, this 
“natural law” conception exists as an alternative to the “utilitarian” concept in the American 
copyright regime.  
To be able to improvise, musicians must go through years of extensive practice hours. John 
Coltrane, an American jazz artist and one of the most influential saxophonists in music history, 
practiced tirelessly all day long and even during concert transmissions.216 Every singly note he 
 
211 Solos in jazz music in this regard refer to the improvisation of jazz musicians which usually takes place after the 
theme has been played and before the theme is revisited again for an ending. 
212 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 46. 
213 Camille Edwards, From Locke to Louboutin: Justifying Fashion Legal Protection with Philosophical Property 
Theories, 4 PENN UNDERGRADUATE L.J. 12, 28 (2017) (citing John Locke, Second Treatise of Government 
(Harlan Davidson 1982, p. 111-112)). 
214 Id. at 29. 
215 JOYCE ET AL., supra note 28, at 47. 
216 See LEWIS PORTER, JOHN COLTRANE: HIS LIFE AND MUSIC, University of Michigan Press; Illustrated edition 
254-55 (January 11, 2000).
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played was unarguably the fruit of his hard work. Thus, applying the Lockean reasoning, one could 
see that Coltrane owned the improvisational works he created. This anecdote does not apply only 
to Coltrane but also to any artists who express their creative ideas in a non-fixed form of expression 
with perseverance demonstrated accordingly. 
5.1.2 The Rhetoric of Misappropriation 
Based on the natural law argument, this rhetorical mode claims that it is “unfair” for a free-
rider to profit from someone else’s work of the mind or to “reap where he or she has not sown.”217 
The fact that someone else has tried to appropriate the creator’s product of the mind indicates that 
such work is worthy of legal protection.218 An empirical study shows that oftentimes excerpts from 
improvisational solos in jazz music are transcribed and published; however, not many jazz artists 
get remuneration from these publications.219 Applying the argument under the misappropriation 
rhetoric, those other than the original creators have appropriated improvised musical phrases that 
signify that the works are worth protecting. Thus, it is “unfair” for jazz artists to have no available 
remedies under copyright law when their works of minds are embezzled. 
Nonetheless, the two rhetorics do have limitations. When it comes to the consideration of 
copyrightability, Lockean reasoning was denied by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1991. 
The Court rejected the "sweat of the brow" or "industrious collection" theory developed by lower 
courts, which justifies the protection of factual compilations as a reward for an author's hard work. 
It reasoned that "sweat of the brow" was not the touchstone of copyright protection; therefore, 
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Rev. 1363, 1365-66 (1997). (conducting the empirical study through telephone interviews with jazz musicians, 
music directors, and entertainment attorneys)
 
 42 
mere fact-based works without original components were not copyrightable. 220 Regarding the 
“fairness” argument in the misappropriation rhetoric, there also needs to have a limit. That is 
because it is not ideal to have an intellectual property regime that would protect every intellectual 
product for an unlimited term,221 which would be against the rhetoric of the public domain.222 
However, it is worth noting that the limitations of the two rhetoric do not only apply to unfixed 
works but also fixed works to the same extent. Thus, the rebuttals to these two rhetorics would not 
justify excluding unfixed works from federal copyright protection. 
5.2 Limited Protection of Unfixed Works in US Jurisdiction 
The U.S. jurisdiction, in fact, does not entirely ignore unfixed works; several state courts 
have protected the works that have no tangible mediums. Moreover, there are both federal and 
state laws that may provide remedies to owners of unfixed materials. Nonetheless, these remedies 
available for the authors of unfixed works are extremely limited. 
5.2.1 Anti-Bootlegging Provisions 
At the federal level, Congress has enacted Section 1101223 outside of the Copyright Act to 
prevent unauthorized audio and video recordings of live musical performances pursuant to the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPs”). This enactment was 
considered a constitutional departure which extends copyright protection to unfixed materials—
musical performances.224 Section 1101(a)(1) prohibits fixation of the sounds and images of a live 
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musical performance without performers’ consent, followed by Section 1101(a)(2) and Section 
1101(a)(3), which make illegal the transmission and distribution of unauthorizedly fixed 
performances, respectively.  
However, this current federal copyright law only helps stage artists prevent unauthorized 
fixation and distribution of their works in very limited circumstances. For jazz musicians, the Anti-
Bootlegging provisions do not prohibit a member in the audience to remember improvisational 
phrases and transcribe them on paper for publication or incorporate them in new works. 225 
Moreover, the provisions only apply to cover musical performances, leaving theatrical works, live 
comedies, and any other non-musical works involving improvisational elements unprotected. 
Therefore, for non-musical works shown on stage for the first time without prepared scripts, 
misappropriation through videotaping by an audience member is not prohibited by the law. Not to 
mention that nowadays, video recording can be conveniently done by every audience member, 
even on the cheapest smartphone. 
5.2.2 Common Law Copyright  
The fact that unfixed works enjoy no federal copyright protection does not mean that they 
go into the public domain right away. Instead, they are considered for protection under the common 
law copyright regime. Observed by the New York Court of Appeals, the recognition of unfixed 
work under state law resulted from the labor theory’s influence of Locke.226 In Williams v. Weisser, 
a professor sued a note service business for selling lecture notes from his classes without 
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authorization.227 The court held that the professor owned the common law copyright of the lectures 
and “oral delivery of lectures did not divest the plaintiff of his common law copyright to his 
lectures.”228 
The Copyright Act of 1976, Section 301(b)(1) explicitly declines to preempt state law with 
respect to “subject matter that does not come within the subject matter of copyright as specified 
by sections 102 and 103, including works of authorship not fixed in any tangible medium of 
expression.”229 As a result, the Ninth Circuit, for instance, has applied a two-pronged test in 
considering preemption of federal copyright law: (1) the work at issue comes within the subject 
matter of copyright, and (2) the state law rights are “equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within 
the general scope of copyright.”230 Nonetheless, not every work that passes the two-prong test 
would be protected under common law copyright; there needs to be appliable law, which varies 
from state to state. In California, for example, there exists state legislation that protects unfixed 
works. For oral lectures, there is a specific bill that bars the commercialization of lecture notes 
without consent.231 Such protection was the success of professors in lobbying for legislation and 
is, nonetheless, not available in some other states. 232  Besides, for improvisational materials, 
California’s statute has a provision that protects improvisational performers and grants them 
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“exclusive ownership in the presentation thereof.”233 However, this protection is one of its kind 
and is not available in other states.234 
Court precedents, moreover, show that unfixed works are not easily granted with common 
law copyright. In Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, the issue presented before the court was 
whether “anecdotes, reminiscences, literary opinions and revealing comments” of Ernest 
Hemingway that were uttered during an interview could be “literary property” protectable under 
New York law.235 The court rejected state law copyright protection over the subject matters, 
reasoning that the author did not “mark off the utterance in question from the ordinary stream of 
speech.”236 Similarly, in Falwell v. Penthouse International, one of the claims brought by the 
publication of the plaintiff’s statements made during interviewed constituted Virginia common-
law copyright infringement.237 The court, nevertheless, dismissed the claim on the ground that 
“[t]here is no defined segregation, either by design or by implication of any of plaintiff's 
expressions of his thoughts and opinions on the subjects discussed which would aid in identifying 
plaintiff's purported copyrighted material.”238  
 Nonetheless, such ground is not likely to be applicable for cases in which contemporary 
artists or improvisational authors try to protect their unfixed works. That is because it is often 
conspicuous to the audience that the author's creative expression is a result of the act of authorship. 
For jazz musicians, solos played on stage are intended for artistic purposes rather than mere 
noodling. For stand-up comedians, the jokes they improvise are known as parts of their profession 
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and are not created to be primarily used in an ordinary course of daily conversation. However, as 
there appears to be no case law on improvisational performances and common law copyright, one 
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6. FORMALITIES AND FIXATION 
 Formalities of registration and deposition have had a significant role in American copyright 
history. Before the Copyright Act of 1976 took effect, the law had required authors to register the 
work before publication and deposit a copy of the work with relevant offices.240 The requirement 
had been taken seriously as a prerequisite for copyright protection, and non-compliance would 
inject the work into the public domain. 241  Nowadays, however, formalities are no longer a 
copyright prerequisite; there was a shift towards Automatic Protection pursuant to the Berne 
Convention Article 5(2), which stipulates that “[t]he enjoyment and the exercise of these rights 
shall not subject to any formality…” Nonetheless, the importance of formalities remains, as 
authors of creative works are still highly incentivized to comply with such.  
Copyright registration was designed to make a public record of the basic facts in a 
copyright claim, 242  entitling the public access to useful information about the owner of the 
underlying work. Although registration is not a copyright prerequisite under the Copyright Act of 
1976, copyright owners have several inducements to register their works. First, Section 411(a) 
clarifies that registration is a requirement for bringing a copyright suit before a federal court.243 
Second, registration establishes prima facie evidence of validity in the work copyright if such 
action is made within five years from the date of publication according to Section 410(c).244 
Moreover, registration made within three months from the date of publication of the work permits 
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statutory damages and attorney fees under Section 412.245 Even though there has been a relatively 
small number of registrants due to the reduced role of registration formality246, the inducements 
for copyright registration in the United States are higher than those in other jurisdictions.247 
Moreover, the importance of registration is so significant that it could exclude unregistered works 
from federal suits. Therefore, copyright holders who have rights that cannot be enforced are 
indistinguishable from authors of unfixed works who receive no copyright protection at all. 
Deposition formality is a requirement that copyright holders must deposit at least one copy 
of the underlying copyright work that has been published. This deposition is required as a part of 
the registration process at the Copyright Office;248 additionally, it can also be demanded in writing 
by the registrar at the Library of Congress.249 As a part of the registration process, Section 408(b) 
requires “in the case of unpublished work, one complete copy or phonorecord.” For published 
work, the law requires “two complete copies or phonorecords of the best edition.” Alternatively, 
deposition of published works can be made at the Library of Congress, which Section 407(a) 
generally requires two complete copies of the best editions. Non-compliance with the timely 
deposition demand made by the Register of Copyrights will result in monetary fines.250 
These formalities help serve at least two purposes; firstly, they provide the public with 
information about the work and the owner of such work; and secondly, they help indicate works 
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that the authors care and desire to protect.251 Deposit requirements, in particular, “are consistent 
with the preservation of cultural heritage and with copyright's constitutional copyright purpose to 
‘promote the progress of science,’ by which the Founders meant knowledge.”252  
Importantly, the two formalities require submitting one or two copies in certain cases of 
the underlying copyright work. By producing a copy, there needs to be some iteration of fixation. 
Therefore, the author of an unfixed work who cares to exercise his rights would eventually find a 
need to fix the work and submit a copy in the copyright registration process. In other words, even 
without fixation as a copyright prerequisite, fixation of creative expression will, nevertheless, must 
be made to satisfy the registration formality. Therefore, fixation as a copyright prerequisite in the 
copyright regime where formalities are demanded is not necessary.  
If a work will need to be fixed anyway to enjoy full remedies available under copyright 
law, what is the difference between having or not having fixation as a copyright prerequisite? First, 
the authors of creative works, regardless of the nature of mediums of expression, will be adequately 
entitled to copyright protection. The authors who pursue contemporary arts with transitory 
mediums of expression and the artists who perform improvisations will receive copyright 
ownership, as do other artists, resulting in a non-discriminatory copyright standard. Secondly, an 
unfixed work will begin receiving copyright protection from the date of expression of idea rather 
than the date of fixation. Thus, if an author of an unfixed work later fixes the work, the work will 
be protected by copyright law during the interval when the work has not been fixed. Accordingly, 
a misappropriation happening during the interval would constitute a copyright infringement claim, 
giving the author a chance to seek remedies under copyright law. 
 
251 Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 Stan. L. REV. 485 (2004).  




To clarify the above arguments, consider the following hypothetical scenario, which 
involves musical improvisation, the use of new technologies, and how fixation will create an 
adverse result upon the author. 
A jazz music professor, teaching a virtual class, improvised a beautiful jazz phrase to his 
students. One student, wanting to study every note the professor plays, activates a music 
transcription software253 on his computer, which transcribes the improvisational excerpt into music 
notation without the professor’s knowledge. After studying the phrase at the student’s own time, 
the student finds that the work is a perfect example of an improvisational method he has been 
developing. As a result, he includes the professor’s material into his jazz improvisation tutorial 
book to be published for sales. To make sample recordings for each particular work included in 
the book, he plays his works and the professor's work on his instrument and records them in MP3 
files, which he bundles with the books put them all for sales. These materials receive a lot of 
attention, generating income for the student. Later, the professor finds out that his work has been 
stolen and used in the student’s book. The professor, thus, claims the ownership of his musical 
phrase, asking the student for a share of the profits. 
Under the current federal copyright law that has the fixation requirement, it would be 
unfortunate for the professor as he will not be able to claim copyright ownership and exercise any 
rights over the improvisational phrase. That is because the musical work has never been fixed 
under his authority.254 Apart from that, the copyright over the phrase could even belong to the 
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especially under the “more than transitory duration” test. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, 53 (1976). Moreover, the 
authorship-as-fixation requirement excludes the professor from obtaining copyright ownership because the work is 
notated by the student’s transcription software or fixed by the student in other words. 
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student, as the fact that the student employs the music transcription software instead of using an 
audio recording or video recording program would make the Anti-Bootlegging provisions 
irrelevant and may give copyright to the student as he has fixed the work.255 In addition, as the 
student plays the phrase on his instrument and records it, he would also be the copyright owner of 
the sound recording. Not fixing the work, the professor will have no available remedies under the 
copyright law. Thus, he could not use a copy of the notation made by the student’s transcription 
program for depository purposes256 that would give him the standing to sue in a federal court.257 
Moreover, provided that the professor starts constructing his copyright claim by writing down the 
phrase in the music sheet after learning about the misappropriation, copyright over the work would 
commence at the time of the writing. In other words, there will be no copyright during the interval 
in which the work has not been fixed, giving the professor a hard time alleging copyright 
infringement over the student’s activities.258 
However, given there is no fixation requirement imposed, the professor would have owned 
copyright over the musical improvisation from the date he first plays it. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, idea/expression dichotomy and creativity can already suffice the requirements of 
copyright in several civil law jurisdictions. Without fixation, the copyright prerequisites in the 
United States would resemble those in civil law nations. As a result, with the work passing the two 
 
255 This anticipation is based on the potential copyright ownership of a person who makes an audio recording on 
mobile phone. The act of pressing the transcription button and pressing the recording button could be of no 
difference. Nonetheless, theoretically it could be argued that activating the music transcription program, although 
fixation occurs, does not require creativity. 
256 See Alicia v. Machete Music, 744 F.3d 773 (1st Cir. 2014) (noting that the deposit requirement was not met when 
the plaintiffs used the allegedly infringing recordings as deposit material). 
257 As previously discussed, registration is a prerequisite to bringing an infringement suit in courts. 
258 See, e.g., Laureyssens v. Idea Grp., Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that “in order to establish a 
claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show ownership…”). 
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prerequisites259, the professor will have a second chance to prove the ownership of his work, which 
will be a matter of evidence in court. He may, for instance, use a student's transcription program's 




















259 When the professor played the jazz phrase on his instrument, his musical idea was expressed. And improvisation 
is a core aspect of musical creativity. See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Creativity, Improvisation, and Risk: Copyright 




 As the Berne Convention leaves the state members open to decide whether to have a 
fixation requirement in their copyright legislations, the civil law countries that may have followed 
the French copyright tradition generally do not require copyright works to be fixed. For instance, 
in France, Germany, China, and Thailand, their provisions on fixation requirements only apply to 
limited subject matters. As a result, sermons and lectures, for example, have been recognized as 
copyright subject matters by courts in France and China, respectively. The United States, on the 
other hand, incorporates British copyright tradition in its copyright system. American copyright 
law prioritizes the protection of “writings” rather than primarily protecting authors’ intellectual 
and moral interests. Accordingly, previous copyright legislations listed copyright subject matters 
that have tangible mediums, and the Copyright Act of 1976 explicitly contains provisions on the 
requirement of fixation. A series of precedents, however, suggest that the fixation has been having 
a hard time adapting to new technologies. Up to this point, it is still uncertain if one should consider 
how long exactly a medium of work needs to last to satisfy the statutory language of “a period of 
more than transitory duration.”  
Consequently, contemporary arts expressed on inherently changing mediums may not 
enjoy copyright protection as other art forms do. Such arts, as well as improvisational works and 
other works that do not require a medium of expression, are unarguable the products of artists’ 
labor. Because these works are capable of being misappropriated, especially when everyone with 
a mobile phone can conveniently make an audio or video recording, the unfixed works should be 
entitled to copyright protection. Nonetheless, the unfixed works are subject to much lesser 
protection. Anti-bootlegging law, for instance, only applies for audio or video recording of live 
musical performances, while common-law copyright does not effectively do the job.  
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Regarding the registration and deposit formalities' role, the research finds that they can 
serve the same function as the fixation requirement. For an author interested in protecting their 
work in court, they must register the work and deposit at least one copy anyway. And by discarding 
fixation as a copyright prerequisite, the author will have a chance in courts upon creating a 
document and comply with the registration process, leaving copyright ownership as the matter of 
proof. Authors of unfixed works will be incentivized to fix the works accordingly. In light of 
promoting useful arts, copyright law should welcome new artforms and accommodate new 
technologies. With the registration and deposition formalities, the thesis contends that fixation, 
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